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In the 5G era, heterogeneous networks (HetNets) are designed for achieving data rates and customized service demands. To realize
this, virtualization technologies are widely accepted as enablers for implementing 5G HetNets, aiming at managing and scheduling
virtualized physical resources in a flexible manner. However, the major focus of the existing research lies on the effective allocation of
virtual resources and maximizing the number of implemented network services, ignoring the virtual resource security issues. However,
the security threats and vulnerabilities due to the complexity of virtualization can lead to major performance outbreaks and information
leakage. Therefore, this article attempts to tackle the security issues in 5G HetNets virtual resource allocation. The article starts from
modeling the major security attacks for virtual resource allocation, through comprehensive discussion on the typical types of security
attacks. Following the attack model, a novel secure framework (VRA-RL-SecAwa) based on emerging reinforcement learning approach, is
presented. The proposed VRA-RL-SecAwa framework works in different phases, 1) Reinforcement learning based preliminary security
preparation, 2) Greedy approach based secure virtual node resource allocation embedding, 3) Secure and shortest path virtual link
resource allocation scheme, and 4) Network reconfiguration and updation. The proposed VRA-RL-SecAwa framework is evaluated
through extensive simulations in order to demonstrate its efficiency and effectiveness. The results obtained validate the superiority of the
proposed framework in contrast to existing variants of its category.
Index Terms
5G HetNets; Reinforcement Learning; Attack Model; Security Awareness; Virtualization Technologies; Virtual Resource Allocation.
1 INTRODUCTION
It is known to all that 5G heterogeneous networks
(HetNets)[1] are designed for meeting the data rates and
customized service demands. Virtualization technologies
(network virtualization [2], network function virtualization,
[3]) are regarded as the enabling technologies towards 5G
HetNets. By running virtualization technologies, physical
resources (e.g. CPUs, storages) can be flexibly abstracted,
managed and scheduled by telecommunication service
providers (TSPs). Therefore, more and more novel services
and applications, equipped with customized resource de-
mands (e.g. CPU, bandwidth), can be developed [4]. Fig.
1 highlights the key issue related to the association of 5G
HetNets and virtual resource allocation technologies while
accommodating more and more services.
In order to accommodate more services to coexist on
the same underlying 5G HetNets, it is vital for the TSP
to allocate virtual resources (e.g. virtualized CPUs, stor-
ages, bandwidths) efficiently (Fig. 1). As a consequence,
it is important to explore the research possibilities and
solutions related to the virtual resource allocation. Related
publications, involving algorithms, currently exist [5-7]. In
the literature, this kind of algorithms are named as virtual
network embedding (VNE) solutions. However, a key prob-
lem is ignored in the virtualization research. The problem is
that the complexity of virtualization can expose additional
security threats and vulnerabilities. The malicious attackers
can utilize these threats and vulnerabilities. These illegal
behaviors will incur the network performance degradation
[7]. Not to mention the further scarce information leakage.
Therefore, the security of virtual resource allocation for 5G
[6] networks cannot be ignored.
Though some attempts (e.g. [8-13]) have been made in
the literature, they are one-sided and not comprehensive.
Hence, these attempts are not applicable for implementing
5G HetNets. For instance, though Fischer et al.[8] discussed
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Fig. 1: Workflow of Virtualized Resource Allocation in 5G HetNets
three traditional types of attacks for 5G networks, nothing
was related to the virtual resource allocation. Discussed
attacks strictly belong to the node attack category. Link
category was not considered in [8], either. With respect to
[9] and [10], they just talked about the security mechanism
in underlying network. What will happen if the potential
risk of virtual nodes share the same underlying network el-
ement. In addition, Hou et al.[11] researched the secure issue
in virtualized optical data center networks. The proposed
secure model was limited in the optical networks. Hence,
it cannot be promoted to universal network virtualization
research. With respect to [12], Wang et al. talked about covert
channel attacks. Wang et al. considered securing multiple
nodes occupying the same physical device. However, the
proposed mechanism for selecting secure physical nodes
was ignored in [12]. While in [13], Besiltas et al. tried to fulfill
virtual resources per virtual network within its allocated
sub-physical network. Besiltas et al. divided the shared un-
derlying network so as to achieve the secure virtual resource
allocation. However, no security model was constructed in
[13]. Besiltas et al. did not consider about the security threats
and vulnerabilities of physical and virtual nodes.
1.1 Contributions of this Article
Based on these backgrounds, the virtual resource alloca-
tion with security awareness for 5G HetNets is investigated
in this article. The major contributions of this article are
highlighted as below:
• By talking about typical security attacks, the security
attacks for virtual resource allocation are modeled
and categorized. The secure virtual resource allo-
cation model is presented, too. For clarity, radio
and power resources are omitted in this article. The
secure CPU, storage and communication bandwidth
resource allocation are mainly considered.
• A novel virtual resource allocation framework with
security awareness, based on reinforcement learning
(RL) approach, is presented and labeled as VRA-
RL-SecAwa. RL approach is currently an emerging
technique to deal with network problems in machine
learning and deep learning areas [14]. The proposed
VRA-RL-SecAwa framework not only selects secure
physical nodes, but also solves the potential covert
channel attacks among virtual nodes, by isolating
occupied physical elements (nodes and links).
• In order to demonstrate the efficiency and effective-
ness of VRA-RL-SecAwa, simulations are performed.
Secure virtual resource allocation strategies in [9] and
[10] are selected for comparison.
1.2 Organization
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Research
background and model description are presented in Section
2. In Section 3, the novel virtual resource allocation frame-
work with security awareness, based on RL approach, is
presented. Simulation results are discussed in Section 4. In
the end, conclusion and future directions are presented.
2 BACKGROUND AND PROBLEM DESCRIPTION
This section is divided into tow parts, 1) the first part
presents the comprehensive details about the research back-
ground and different types of security attacks in context
with the virtual resource allocation, 2) the second part
provides the insights related to the problem description for
secure virtual resource allocation.
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TABLE 1: Four Types of Security Attacks in 5G HetNets Virtualization
Item Attack Type Name Attacking Example Primary Security Hazard and Potential Result
1 Physical Element Attacking Virtual Element Type Sniffing Attack Degrade the virtual network service quality
2 Virtual Element Attacking Physical Element Type Denial of Service Lead to the supporting physical node paralysis
3 Attacks Among Virtual Elements Type Covert Channel Attacks Mess up all virtual network services
4 Attacks in the Physical Links Type Replay Attacks Unavailability of physical links and connected nodes
2.1 Research Background and Types of Security Attack
Though virtualization technology brings flexible re-
source allocation for meeting various demands of 5G Het-
Nets, it is a two-edged sword in terms of security [5]. As
the virtualization technology introduces an additional layer
between the architecture and the end of systems, more
complexity is involved. Generally speaking, the security
issue in virtual resource allocation for 5G HetNets can be
classified into four types of security attacks: Physical Ele-
ment Attacking Virtual Element, Virtual Element Attacking
Physical Element, Attacks Among Virtual Elements, Attacks
in the Physical Elements Type, which are illustrated in Table
I. These four types of security attacks are described as below.
• Physical Element Attacking Virtual Element: In this
type, the physical element usually refers to the phys-
ical node. As known to all, the underlying nodes of
physical network are are responsible for the man-
agement of virtual nodes. Following the contracted
SLA and regulations, the accepted node will assign
the virtualized resources (e.g. CPU, storage) to the
virtual node. The virtual element can deploy its soft-
wares on the physical node. However, if the physical
element is seized control by an attacker, he can edit
and cheat the virtual element information. Usually,
an attack will be done on the virtual element, such as
the sniffing attack (Table I).
• Virtual Element Attacking Physical Element: Similar
to the above type, the deployed virtual node may
conduct the attack to the embedded physical node.
Since the virtualization process of the physical node
has vulnerabilities, the attacking virtual node will
seize. In many cases, the attacking virtual node is not
satisfied with achieving administration privileges, it
will try to launch the denial of service (DoS) (Table
I) attack [11] so as to inject redundant information.
If this done, this will lead to the physical node
overloaded. None virtual service cannot be deployed
in this physical node any more.
• Attacks Among Virtual Elements: In 5G HetNets
resource allocation, different virtual network service-
sare allowed to share one physical network. That
means virtual nodes may share the same physical
element, including its hardware and software re-
sources can exist. In this case, there usually exists
one covert channel. By the channel, these virtual
nodes can exchange their own information. In some
cases,certain virtual node will seize the side-channel
attacks [12]. Therefore, the security issue of side-
channel attacks emerges.
• Attacks in the Physical Links: The last security type
is the Attacks in the Physical Links Type [13], cannot
be ignored, either. For instance, if certain physical
device is placed on a substrate link, not managed
by the TSP, the physical device may be attacked by
certain attacker. That attacker can perform multiple
attacks on the substrate link, such as man-in-the-
middle at tacks and so on (Table. I). Hence, this type
of security issue cannot be ignored. While allocating
and mapping virtual links to physical paths, the
physical paths, having equal or higher security level
than the mapped virtual links, ought to be selected
in priority.
With introducing the above four types of security attacks
and listing out main security results (Table. I) [6][8], it is
vital to research and propose a novel virtualization resource
allocation framework with security awareness, which acts
as an enabler to tackle these security attacks.
2.2 Problem Description
After introducing the security types, it is necessary to
model these security types and virtual resource allocation
for 5G networks formally. For a better understanding of
the problem modeling and description for secure virtual
resource allocation, the Fig. 2 has been presented. With
respect to the model of security, the abstraction method so
as to model the security constraints is adopted. The secu-
rity model consists of two parts: security level and security
demand. The security level part is not limited in a scalar. It
ought to be expressed by a vector parameter. This formula-
tion method aims at capturing the security guarantees for
network elements [6][8]. Within the security level variance,
two main insights are responsible: one is the heterogeneous
customer needs, the other is the different upgrading physi-
cal network elements. That is to say, the underlying physical
network consists of different generations of physical nodes
and virtualization softwares. Especially to the virtualiza-
tion softwares, they can offer different security guarantees.
Hence, the security level modeling method is sufficient to
abstract the security difference from the theoretical aspect.
With respect to the security demand part, it is formulated
by security levels. The security demand can be fulfilled
by the substrate node enabling to provide equal or higher
level. This modeling method contributes to embracing many
distinct forms of security demands. In Fig. 2, the (L3, D2)
in the virtual service request indicates that the virtual node
requires the assigned physical node to have the security
level of 3 and a security demand of no less than 2. The
4
Fig. 2: Example of Secure Virtual Resource Allocation in 5G HetNets
8 (L2) in the same virtual request represents the virtual
link has a demand of 8 bandwidths and a security level
demand of no less than 2. The virtual resource allocation for
5G networks is composed of two sub-models: for the whole
underlying physical network and for the virtual service.
The whole substrate network is usually modeled as an
undirected graph, consisting of multiple substrate nodes
and links. To the whole substrate nodes, they are the abstrac-
tions of hosts, switches, routers, phones. These abstracted
nodes have similar resources, such as CPUs, storages, placed
locations and so on. In this article, CPU, storage and placed
location are selected as virtualized node resources, aiming
at being allocated to virtual network services. With respect
to the virtual links, they are adopted to connect virtual
nodes. Optical fiber and twisted pairs are abstracted into
virtual links. Virtualized link resources are communication
bandwidths in this article. Virtualized substrate (node and
link) resources are plotted and labeled in Fig. 2.
With respect to the other sub-model, it is the virtual
network service request. Same to the physical network, it
is abstracted into an undirected graph. It can be seen as a
combination of virtual node and link resources. The virtual
network service request is shown in Fig. 2 (a). Demanded
node and link resources and securities are labeled out. In
addition, the allocation and mapping results are shown in
Fig. 2 (b): virtual node A is assigned to substrate node a
whileB is mapped onto b. Virtual linkAB is accommodated
by physical path ab. Meanwhile, all resource and security
demands are fulfilled. We highlight the consumed physical
elements in light red. Take note that security demand of the
virtual network must be satisfied.
3 VRA-RL-SECAWA: VIRTUAL RESOURCE AL-
LOCATION WITH SECURITY AWARENESS
The different phases of VRA-RL-SecAwa framework are
described in the subsequent sections.
3.1 Workflow of VRA-RL-SecAwa
The proposed framework is labeled as VRA-RL-SecAwa
in this paper. In this sub-section, the workflow of VRA-RL-
SecAwa (Fig. 3 (a)) is plotted so as to assist readers to easily
understand the procedures of the VRA-RL-SecAwa allocating
and mapping virtual resources to each demanded virtual
network service.
3.2 Secure Virtual Resource Allocation Framework
Along with the Fig. 3 (a), the virtual resource allocation
of certain virtual network service, V Nv , is described as
an example. For allocating virtual resources of physical
network (PN) to V Nv , VRA-RL-SecAwa has the following
four key procedures:
3.2.1 RL-Based Preliminary Security Preparation
According to previous proposals [5][6][7], it is proved
that quantified node values, no matter substrate or virtual,
are the basis and have an influence on the quality of vir-
tual resource allocation. Hence, it is important to adopt
an efficient calculation method so as to ensure the quality
of virtual resource allocation. As presented in the existing
proposal [15], node values are calculated by incorporating
multiple topology attributes and global resources. By pro-
viding proof and conducting simulation, the existing node
ranking approach has been proved efficient, comparing with
existing publications [5][6]. Based on the gained research
results [15], the security level and security demand are
incorporated into the product of calculating resource block.
With respect to remaining procedures, they are same to what
are presented in [15]. Finally, one kind of stable node values
can be calculated: for all virtual nodes of the V Nv . The
number of virtual node value is equal to ||V Nv||.
With respect to the physical node values of the underly-
ing PN, the emerging RL approach [14] is adopted, aiming
at achieving a thorough knowledge of PN. In this article,
four different attributes (Topology, Resource, Security, and
Demand) per physical node are firstly extracted. Then,
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these extracted attributes are normalized and concatenated
into the feature vector. In total, |PN | vectors form up an
extracted matrix, acting as the input of RL agent, which is
called as the policy network in AI area. See Fig. 3 (b). Then,
the input matrix will go through three phases. With respect
to detailed procedures of these three phrases, they are same
to [14]. Comparing with the universal procedures of policy
network in [14], the main difference and highlight is that
Topology, Security and Demand attributes are incorporated
as input, not just the Resource attribute. Within the policy
network (Fig. 3(b)), the universal policy gradient method
is adopted to train and testing the whole PN. In the end,
candidate physical nodes, having high probability values,
are selected.
3.2.2 Greedy Approach for Secure Virtual Node Resource
Allocation Embedding
After completing the preparation, our VRA-RL-SecAwa
starts to do the secure virtual resource allocation for V Nv .
The secure allocation for V Nv consists of two parts: secure
greedy node allocation and secure link resource allocation.
We firstly talk about the secure greedy node allocation. The
virtual node having highest value is processed in priority.
We will select the RL-based physical node having highest
value in priority. If the resources (CPU, storage), security
level and demand of the physical node fulfill the highest
virtual node. The first virtual node embedding is done.
Remaining virtual nodes will be processed, following the
strategy. Hence, the secure virtual node resource allocation
is guaranteed.
3.2.3 Secure and Shortest Path Virtual Link Resource Al-
location Scheme
With all nodes in V Nv are embedded and corresponding
resource demands are fulfilled, we will continue the secure
virtual links embedding. Meanwhile, security and resource
demands per virtual link must be guaranteed. We select one
virtual link as the example. Two end nodes of the virtual
link are done in the previous procedure. We need to select
the most suitable physical path from the path set of two
end nodes. Take note that three extra requirements must be
fulfilled. At first, the selected physical path must have the
lowest number of intermediate nodes among all physical
links. Then, the security of the selected path must be larger
or equal to the virtual link. Thirdly, it must reserve enough
bandwidth for the virtual link. This link mapping strategy
is accepted as the upgraded version [6]. Follow this scheme
to embed remaining virtual links. When all virtual links are
done, the link security and resource allocation are done.
3.2.4 Network Reconfiguration and Updation
With allocating virtual node and link resource of the
virtual network service V Nv successfully, the resource in-
formation of the underlying network is updated. In addi-
tion, the underlying network is reconfigured. The reason of
reconfiguration is that the third type of attack may influence
the virtualization quality. In above three procedures, type
one, two and four are considered. With respect to the third
type of attack, it must be dealt with before new virtual net-
work service is allocated. Within this procedure, all assigned
(a) Workflow of VRA-RL-SecAwa
(b) RL-based Policy Network Construction
Fig. 3: Proposed Framework
substrate nodes and substrate paths are deleted. Here, the
aim is to isolate different virtual networks from each other.
In this case, the side-channel attacks in the same substrate
node does not exist any more. When certain virtual network
expires, the allocated resources are released. Consequently,
deleted substrate elements are added to the underlying
substrate again. Since the underlying network scale is great
and scale of virtual network service is much smaller than the
substrate network, the situation where no enough substrate
elements are reserved for accommodating following virtual
network services is not of much importance.
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3.3 Discussion of VRA-RL-SecAwa Complexity
This sub-section is about the time complexity of VRA-RL-
SecAwa framework, consisting of four procedures. The first
procedure is about the preliminary security preparation. It
can be completed no more than O((|NP |) · log(1/δ)) [15].
|NP | records the number of total physical nodes. The phys-
ical network scale is usually larger than the virtual network
scale. δ represents the small positive number, indicating
the learning rate. With respect to the second (greedy node
allocation) and third (shortest path allocation) procedures,
they are both polynomial-time procedures [7]. The fourth
procedure is completed less than O(|NP |+ |LP |) [7], where
|LP | refers to total physical links. Therefore, the VRA-RL-
SecAwa framework is able to complete any virtual network
service allocation and mapping within polynomial time.
TABLE 2: Simulation Parameter Setting
Parameter Value description
Substrate node amount 100
Substrate link amount 600
Substrate CPU, storage
and link bandwidth
Real number, Uniformly distributed
[50,100]
Security level of sub-
strate node
Integer number, Uniformly distributed
[1,5]
Security demand of
substrate node and link
Integer number, Uniformly distributed
[1,5]





Virtual CPU, node stor-
age and link bandwidth
demand
Real number, Uniformly distributed
[0,10]
Security level of virtual
node
Integer number, Uniformly distributed
[1,5]
Security demand of vir-
tual node and link
Integer number, Uniformly distributed
[1,5]
4 SIMULATION EVALUATION
The proposed framework has been evaluated in a sim-
ulated environment for validating its effectiveness in 5G
HetNets. The simulation settings, results obtained and asso-
ciated discussion are presented in the subsequent sections.
4.1 Simulation Environment
Since virtualization technology in 5G networks is still in
its infancy, the proposed VRA-RL-SecAwa has been evalu-
ated through extensive simulations. The underlying phys-
ical network and all virtual network service requests are
modeled by GT-ITM software. The parameter settings of
(substrate and virtual) networks are listed in Table. II. Here,
the virtual network services are requested following the
Poisson process. The arrival rate is set 5 per 100 time units.
1 time unit represents 1 minute in the simulation part. The
simulations are set 10000 time units. Regarding parameters
of policy network (Fig. 3 (b)), training process, and testing
process, they are same to what are detailed in [14].
4.2 Results and Discussion
In this subsection, we record and plot main simulation
results in Fig. 4. Then, we discuss the simulation results.
Selected virtual allocation strategies (cSAv [9], Sec-bd [10])
are modified so as to make them be mostly closely related
to the proposed VRA-RL-SecAwa.
1) Virtual Network Service Acceptance Ratio: Serving as
the leading metric in virtual resource allocation research,
we firstly plot the acceptance ratio results of all selected
framework and strategies. Obviously, we can easily find that
all framework and strategies undergo the decrease of service
acceptance ratio. The reason for acceptance ratio decreasing
is the limited physical resources. When the simulation work
starts, there exist abundant physical resources. Thus, new
requested virtual network services can be deployed. Virtual
resource and security demands are fulfilled. The acceptance
ratio will remain in a high level. However, the physical
resources are limited. Thus cannot keeping acceptance ratio
high.
In addition, our VRA-RL-SecAwa achieves higher ac-
ceptance ratio than the remaining two strategies. The sec-
ond best behaved strategy is Sec-bd throughout the whole
simulation. For example, since 1000 time point, the accep-
tance ratio of VRA-RL-SecAwa is higher than that of Sec-
bd. Throughout the whole evaluation, the gap is firstly
becoming small then return to large statue. The causes of our
VRA-RL-SecAwa highest acceptance ratio are its extracted
topology attributes, node value method, and RL-based ap-
proach. The efficiency of topology attributes and node value
method was discussed in previous publication [15]. We do
not repeat in this paper again. With respect to the efficient
RL-based approach, it enables to achieve the node potential.
Therefore, the physical nodes, having enough resources and
security demands, are usually highlighted to be selected.
Consequently, they are adopted to allocate virtual resources
and achieve secure goals.
2) Long-term TSP Revenue and Long-term TSP Revenue
to Cost Ratio: It is not wise to talk the TSP revenue and
revenue to cost ratio separately. Thus, we decide to discuss
both kinds of simulation results together. Apparently, our
proposed VRA-RL-SecAwa achieves the highest revenue and
revenue to cost among three framework/strategies. The
reason for the advantage behaviors is discussed for the
acceptance ratio. By extracting and quantifying proper at-
tributes and RL approach, the most suitable physical nodes
and paths will be selected out. Therefore, more physical
resources can be reserved for more virtual services. When
accepting more service, the revenue will be maximized. At
the same time, the whole physical network will be utilized
to its capacity. Therefore, the long-term revenue to cost ratio
will be maximized, too.
5 CONCLUSIONS AND OPEN DIRECTIONS
Since secure network connectivity and resource alloca-
tion are important for 5G HetNets, we research the secure
issue in this article. In particular, formal model for secure
virtual resource allocation is constructed. A novel frame-
work (VRA-RL-SecAwa) with security awareness, based on
reinforcement learning approach, is proposed. To validate
7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10







































1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10





























1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10







































Fig. 4: Simulation Evaluation Results
the VRA-RL-SecAwa efficiency and effectiveness, the simu-
lation experiments are performed and described. Since the
secure issue for 5G HetNets is still in its infancy, we present
some future directions below:
5.1 Future Directions and Open Issues
1) Incorporate Historical Security Data: One possible direc-
tion of the secure virtual resource allocation in 5G HetNets is
to perfect the constructed security model. In real network-
ing environment, incorporating historical security data [9]
to model the security probability is very important. With
adding historical security data, the security model can be
perfected, further revealing the characteristics of network
element threats and vulnerabilities [6]. If that, the perfected
security model will be more convincing.
2) Propose Other Efficient Frameworks and Allocation Algo-
rithms: Though the proposed VRA-RL-SecAwa framework is
proved efficient by simulation, there exists space proposing
other efficient frameworks and virtual resource allocation
algorithms. For instance, following researchers can quantify
other security-related attributes [8] in the preliminary prepa-
ration procedure so as to highlight and select the secure
nodes.
3) Develop Emerging Meta-Heuristic Frameworks and Al-
gorithms: Another possible direction is to develop more
emerging meta-heuristic algorithms. Existing metaheuris-
tics such as ant colony optimization [6] can be adopted
to find efficient HetNet allocation solutions by succeeding
in improving certain one solution, according to the given
measuring method.
4) Expand Experiment Network Scale: The scale of substrate
network in this article is limited within 100 nodes, accepted
as the medium scale in network research [3]. If the network
scale expands, can our VRA-RL-SecAwa framework work
and converged within allowed time? The research of its
convergence requires extra attention.
5) Other Network Application Scenarios: In this article, the
VRA-RL-SecAwa framework is simply evaluated in the 5G
HetNets scenario. With respect to other network scenarios,
such as the Data Center (DC) Networks, pure computer net-
works, and cellular networks, the VRA-RL-SecAwa should
be adopted to deal with the virtual resource allocation.
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research contributions in the area of machine learning, big data analyt-
ics, cloud computing, and vehicular ad hoc networks. He also received
the IEEE ICC Best Paper Award in 2018 and IEEE TCSC Early Career
Research Award 2020.
Georges Kaddoum (M’11) received the bachelor degree in electri-
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